Social Choice for Agents with General Utilities

Authors: Hongyao Ma, Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes

IJCAI 2016 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details

Reproducibility Variable Result LLM Response
Research Type Theoretical Our main result extends the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility result by showing that, for two agents, the only truthful mechanism for at least three alternatives under general decreasing utilities remains dictatorial. We then show how to extend the VCG mechanism to work under a more general utility space than quasilinear (the parallel domain ) and show that the parallel domain is maximal no mechanism with the VCG properties exists in any larger domain.
Researcher Affiliation Academia Hongyao Ma Harvard University hma@seas.harvard.edu Reshef Meir Technion Israel Inst. of Technology reshefm@ie.technion.ac.il David C. Parkes Harvard University parkes@eecs.harvard.edu
Pseudocode Yes Mechanism 1: VCG Mechanism (QL Utilities) Input: Bids bi,j for any i 2 N and j 2 A Set x(b) , j = arg maxj2A i2N bi,j // allocation rule Set ti(b) = maxj i06=i bi0,j P i06=i bi0,j // payment rule
Open Source Code No Information insufficient. The paper does not provide any statement about releasing source code or a link to a code repository.
Open Datasets No Information insufficient. The paper is theoretical and does not mention using any datasets.
Dataset Splits No Information insufficient. The paper is theoretical and does not mention dataset splits for training, validation, or testing.
Hardware Specification No Information insufficient. The paper is theoretical and does not mention any hardware specifications used for experiments.
Software Dependencies No Information insufficient. The paper is theoretical and does not mention any software dependencies with version numbers.
Experiment Setup No Information insufficient. The paper is theoretical and does not describe an experimental setup with hyperparameters or training configurations.