Swap Stability in Schelling Games on Graphs

Authors: Aishwarya Agarwal, Edith Elkind, Jiarui Gan, Alexandros Voudouris1758-1765

AAAI 2020 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details

Reproducibility Variable Result LLM Response
Research Type Theoretical We study the existence, computational complexity and quality of equilibrium assignments in these games, both from a social welfare perspective and from a diversity perspective. We prove bounds on the price of anarchy and the price of stability for many interesting cases, and show that computing an assignment with high social welfare is NP-complete
Researcher Affiliation Academia Aishwarya Agarwal, Edith Elkind, Jiarui Gan, Alexandros A. Voudouris Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford aishwarya.agarwal@keble.ox.ac.uk, {edith.elkind, jiarui.gan, alexandros.voudouris}@cs.ox.ac.uk
Pseudocode No The paper does not contain any structured pseudocode or algorithm blocks.
Open Source Code No The paper is theoretical and does not mention releasing source code for any described methodology. It refers to an arXiv pre-print for full proofs, not code.
Open Datasets No The paper is theoretical and does not use or refer to any datasets for training or evaluation.
Dataset Splits No The paper is theoretical and does not describe experimental setups involving training, validation, or test data splits.
Hardware Specification No The paper is theoretical and does not describe any hardware specifications used for experiments.
Software Dependencies No The paper is theoretical and does not list any specific software dependencies with version numbers.
Experiment Setup No The paper is theoretical and does not describe any experimental setup details, hyperparameters, or training configurations.