Notice: The reproducibility variables underlying each score are classified using an automated LLM-based pipeline, validated against a manually labeled dataset. LLM-based classification introduces uncertainty and potential bias; scores should be interpreted as estimates. Full accuracy metrics and methodology are described in [1].
Symmetric Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Resource Allocation
Authors: L. Cigler, B. Faltings
JAIR 2014 | Venue PDF | LLM Run Details
| Reproducibility Variable | Result | LLM Response |
|---|---|---|
| Research Type | Theoretical | We analyze symmetric protocols to rationally coordinate on an asymmetric, efficient allocation in an infinitely repeated N-agent, C-resource allocation problems, where the resources are all homogeneous. Bhaskar proposed one way to achieve this in 2-agent, 1resource games: Agents start by symmetrically randomizing their actions, and as soon as they each choose different actions, they start to follow a potentially asymmetric convention that prescribes their actions from then on. We extend the concept of convention to the general case of infinitely repeated resource allocation games with N agents and C resources. We show that for any convention, there exists a symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium which implements it. We present two conventions: bourgeois, where agents stick to the first allocation; and market, where agents pay for the use of resources, and observe a global coordination signal which allows them to alternate between different allocations. We define price of anonymity of a convention as a ratio between the maximum social payoffof any (asymmetric) strategy profile and the expected social payoffof the subgame-perfect equilibrium which implements the convention. We show that while the price of anonymity of the bourgeois convention is infinite, the market convention decreases this price by reducing the conflict between the agents. This introduction clearly outlines the theoretical nature of the work, focusing on extending game theory concepts and proving existence and properties of equilibria. Further sections like "Existence of an Equilibrium Implementation" (Lemma 1, 2, 3, Corollary 1) and "Calculating the Equilibrium" (Algorithm 1, Theorem 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18, 20) reinforce the theoretical and analytical focus. Figures 3-11 are analytical plots, not experimental results from a system. |
| Researcher Affiliation | Academia | Ludek Cigler EMAIL Boi Faltings EMAIL Artificial Intelligence Laboratory Ecole Polytechnique F ed erale de Lausanne CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland |
| Pseudocode | Yes | Algorithm 1 Calculating the equilibrium probabilities |
| Open Source Code | No | The paper does not contain any explicit statement about releasing source code for the methodology described, nor does it provide a link to a code repository. |
| Open Datasets | No | The paper is theoretical, defining a "resource allocation game" and analyzing its properties. It does not use any external or publicly available datasets for empirical evaluation. |
| Dataset Splits | No | The paper is theoretical and does not involve experimental evaluation on datasets, hence no dataset splits are provided. |
| Hardware Specification | No | The paper is theoretical and analyzes game-theoretic concepts. It does not describe any computational experiments that would require specific hardware. |
| Software Dependencies | No | The paper describes theoretical algorithms and mathematical models but does not specify any software dependencies or their version numbers for implementation. |
| Experiment Setup | No | The paper is theoretical and focuses on game-theoretic analysis rather than empirical experiments. Therefore, it does not include details such as hyperparameters, model initialization, or training schedules. |