Trembling Hand Equilibria of Plurality Voting
Authors: Svetlana Obraztsova, Zinovi Rabinovich, Edith Elkind, Maria Polukarov, Nicholas R. Jennings
IJCAI 2016 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details
| Reproducibility Variable | Result | LLM Response |
|---|---|---|
| Research Type | Theoretical | In this paper, we analyze TH equilibria of Plurality voting. We provide an efficient algorithm for computing a TH best response and establish many useful properties of TH equilibria in Plurality voting games. On the negative side, we provide an example of a Plurality voting game with no TH equilibria, and show that it is NP-hard to check whether a given Plurality voting game admits a TH equilibrium where a specific candidate is among the election winners. |
| Researcher Affiliation | Collaboration | Svetlana Obraztsova Hebrew University of Jerusalem Zinovi Rabinovich Mobileye Vision Technologies Ltd. Edith Elkind University of Oxford United Kingdom Maria Polukarov University of Southampton United Kingdom Nicholas R. Jennings Imperial College United Kingdom |
| Pseudocode | No | The paper does not contain structured pseudocode or algorithm blocks. |
| Open Source Code | No | The paper does not provide concrete access to source code for the methodology described. |
| Open Datasets | No | This is a theoretical paper and does not use or refer to any publicly available datasets for empirical evaluation. |
| Dataset Splits | No | This is a theoretical paper and does not describe empirical experiments with dataset splits. |
| Hardware Specification | No | This is a theoretical paper and does not mention any specific hardware used for running experiments. |
| Software Dependencies | No | This is a theoretical paper and does not mention specific software dependencies with version numbers. |
| Experiment Setup | No | This is a theoretical paper and does not describe an experimental setup with hyperparameters or training configurations. |