Truthfulness of a Proportional Sharing Mechanism in Resource Exchange

Authors: Yukun Cheng, Xiaotie Deng, Qi Qi, Xiang Yan

IJCAI 2016 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details

Reproducibility Variable Result LLM Response
Research Type Theoretical The main result is a proof that an agent manipulating the proportional sharing mechanism by misreporting its resource amount will not benefit its own utility eventually. This result establishes a strategic stability property of the resource exchange protocol. We further illustrate and confirm the result via network examples. In this paper, we solve this open problem and prove the truthfulness of the proportional sharing mechanism.
Researcher Affiliation Academia 1Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics, Hangzhou China ykcheng@amss.ac.cn 2Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai China dengxiaotie@sjtu.edu.cn, xyansjtu@163.com 3The Hongkong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong kaylaqi@ust.hk
Pseudocode No The paper does not contain structured pseudocode or algorithm blocks.
Open Source Code No The paper does not provide concrete access to source code for the methodology described in this paper.
Open Datasets No The paper is theoretical and does not use datasets for empirical training. The numerical example is illustrative, not based on a publicly available dataset.
Dataset Splits No The paper is theoretical and does not involve dataset splits for training, validation, or testing.
Hardware Specification No The paper is theoretical and does not specify any hardware details used for running experiments.
Software Dependencies No The paper is theoretical and does not specify any software dependencies with version numbers needed to replicate an experiment.
Experiment Setup No The paper is theoretical and does not provide specific experimental setup details such as hyperparameters or training configurations.