Voting with Preference Intensities

Authors: Anson Kahng, Mohamad Latifian, Nisarg Shah

AAAI 2023 | Conference PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details

Reproducibility Variable Result LLM Response
Research Type Theoretical We design near-optimal voting rules which aggregate such preference rankings with intensities using the recently-popular distortion framework. We also show that traditional voting rules, which aggregate preference rankings while ignoring (or not eliciting) intensities, can incur significant welfare loss.
Researcher Affiliation Academia Anson Kahng1, Mohamad Latifian2, Nisarg Shah2 1 University of Rochester 2 University of Toronto akahng2@cs.rochester.edu, latifian@cs.toronto.edu, nisarg@cs.toronto.edu
Pseudocode No Not found. The paper does not contain any pseudocode or algorithm blocks.
Open Source Code No Not found. The paper is theoretical and does not mention providing open-source code for its methodology or analysis.
Open Datasets No Not applicable. The paper is theoretical and does not involve datasets or empirical evaluation.
Dataset Splits No Not applicable. The paper is theoretical and does not involve datasets or empirical evaluation.
Hardware Specification No Not applicable. The paper is theoretical and does not describe computational experiments that would require specific hardware.
Software Dependencies No Not applicable. The paper is theoretical and does not describe computational experiments that would require specific software dependencies with version numbers.
Experiment Setup No Not applicable. The paper is theoretical and does not describe any experimental setup or hyperparameters.